Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

R.M.W.J. Beetsma; A.L. Bovenberg

Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

R.M.W.J. Beetsma
, A.L. Bovenberg

TS Economics and Management

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Abstract

This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the union.

Original language	English
Publisher	Unknown Publisher
Number of pages	23
Volume	1995-58
Publication status	Published - 1995

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	1995-58

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

Central Banks
Monetary Policy
EMS
Fiscal Policy
monetary economics

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58

Cite this

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KW - Monetary Policy

KW - EMS

KW - Fiscal Policy

KW - monetary economics

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1995-58

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

PB - Unknown Publisher

ER -

Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

Abstract

Publication series

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

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