Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

C.T. Hoang, K. Hüschelrath, U. Laitenberger, F. Smuda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
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Abstract

We empirically investigate determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm’s share in the cartelized market. Our results suggest, inter alia, that the reform of the European corporate leniency program in 2002 had a positive effect on the incentives to self-report.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-23
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Volume40
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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