TY - JOUR
T1 - Developing countries, tax treaty shopping and the global minimum tax
AU - Riet, Maarten van ‘t
AU - Lejour, Arjan
PY - 2025/11
Y1 - 2025/11
N2 - Analysis of the international network of double tax treaties reveals a large potential for tax avoidance. Developing countries are, on average, not more likely to suffer from tax revenue losses than other countries. Yet, this average masks the fact that several countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, are vulnerable to substantial potential losses of withholding tax revenue by treaty shopping. The analysis combines tax parameters of more than a hundred countries with an algorithm from network theory, which simulates the tax minimizing behaviour of multinational enterprises. We introduce the notion of potentially aggressive tax treaties. These are the key treaties in treaty shopping routes, that may lead to substantial tax revenue losses in developing countries. Moreover, under the rules of the global minimum tax, the treaty partners are often in a prime position to top-up tax undertaxed profits of developing countries that offer tax incentives to attract investment, thus nullifying the incentive effects
AB - Analysis of the international network of double tax treaties reveals a large potential for tax avoidance. Developing countries are, on average, not more likely to suffer from tax revenue losses than other countries. Yet, this average masks the fact that several countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, are vulnerable to substantial potential losses of withholding tax revenue by treaty shopping. The analysis combines tax parameters of more than a hundred countries with an algorithm from network theory, which simulates the tax minimizing behaviour of multinational enterprises. We introduce the notion of potentially aggressive tax treaties. These are the key treaties in treaty shopping routes, that may lead to substantial tax revenue losses in developing countries. Moreover, under the rules of the global minimum tax, the treaty partners are often in a prime position to top-up tax undertaxed profits of developing countries that offer tax incentives to attract investment, thus nullifying the incentive effects
KW - Tax treaties
KW - Developing countries
KW - Treaty shopping
KW - Tax avoidance
U2 - 10.1177/10911421251334849
DO - 10.1177/10911421251334849
M3 - Article
SN - 1091-1421
VL - 53
SP - 671
EP - 732
JO - Public Finance Review
JF - Public Finance Review
IS - 6
ER -