Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing

Evidence from fMRI

Matthias Schurz*, Christoph Kogler, Thomas Scherndl, Martin Kronbichler, Anton Kuehberger

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We asked participants to predict which of two colors a similar other (student) and a dissimilar other (retiree) likes better. We manipulated if color-pairs were two hues from the same color-category (e.g. green) or two conceptually different colors (e.g. green versus blue). In the former case, the mental state that has to be represented (i.e., the percept of two different hues of green) is predominantly non-conceptual or phenomenal in nature, which should promote mental simulation as a strategy for mentalizing. In the latter case, the mental state (i.e. the percept of green versus blue) can be captured in thought by concepts, which facilitates the use of theories for mentalizing. In line with the self-projection hypothesis, we found that cortical midline areas including vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus were preferentially activated for mentalizing about a similar other. However, activation was not affected by the nature of the color-difference, suggesting that self-projection subsumes simulation-like processes but is not limited to them. This indicates that self-projection is a universal strategy applied in different contexts-irrespective of the availability of theories for mentalizing. Along with midline activations linked to self-projection, we also observed activation in right lateral frontal and dorsal parietal areas showing a theory-like pattern. Taken together, this shows that mentalizing does not operate based on simulation or theory, but that both strategies are used concurrently to predict the choices of others.

Original languageEnglish
Article number0121405
Number of pages19
JournalPLoS ONE
Volume10
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25 Mar 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX
  • SOCIAL COGNITION
  • METAANALYSIS
  • BRAIN
  • COLOR
  • JUDGMENTS
  • REFLECTION
  • OTHERS
  • HUMANS
  • MIND

Cite this

Schurz, Matthias ; Kogler, Christoph ; Scherndl, Thomas ; Kronbichler, Martin ; Kuehberger, Anton. / Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing : Evidence from fMRI. In: PLoS ONE. 2015 ; Vol. 10, No. 3.
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Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing : Evidence from fMRI. / Schurz, Matthias; Kogler, Christoph; Scherndl, Thomas; Kronbichler, Martin; Kuehberger, Anton.

In: PLoS ONE, Vol. 10, No. 3, 0121405, 25.03.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Kogler, Christoph

AU - Scherndl, Thomas

AU - Kronbichler, Martin

AU - Kuehberger, Anton

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KW - SOCIAL COGNITION

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KW - JUDGMENTS

KW - REFLECTION

KW - OTHERS

KW - HUMANS

KW - MIND

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JO - PLoS ONE

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