Director networks and takeovers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)218-234
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume28
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014

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Equity
Announcement returns

Keywords

  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • director networks
  • centrality
  • connections

Cite this

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Director networks and takeovers. / Renneboog, L.D.R.; Zhao, Y.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 28, 10.2014, p. 218-234.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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