Director networks, turnover, and appointments

Luc Renneboog, Yang Zhao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non‐executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities. Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)44-76
JournalEuropean Financial Management
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

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Turnover
Labour market
Information asymmetry
Performance improvement
Information acquisition
Methodology
Social networks
Market information
Non-executive directors
Weak ties
Market performance

Keywords

  • corporate governance
  • director appointments
  • director networks
  • director turnover

Cite this

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Director networks, turnover, and appointments. / Renneboog, Luc; Zhao, Yang.

In: European Financial Management, Vol. 26, No. 1, 01.2020, p. 44-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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