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Disability risk, disability benefits, and equilibrium unemployment

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

This paper analyses the labour market and efficiency effects of various kinds of disability policies. It therefore extends Pissarides (1990) model of equilibrium unemployment with disability risk and disability benefits and allows for the improper use of disability schemes by the unemployed. The paper finds that recognition of this improper use can reverse the ranking of policies. In addition, it concludes that disability policies that reduce the participation in disability schemes tend to increase the rate of official unemployment. Only policies that lower the rate of disability shocks succeed to reduce both the participation in disability and unemployment schemes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-244
JournalInternational Tax and Public Finance
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 1 - No Poverty
    SDG 1 No Poverty
  2. SDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth
    SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
  3. SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities
    SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities

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