Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps

H. Ismayilov, J.J.M. Potters

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. We measure how advisors expect decisionmakers to react to their advice in order to distinguish between strategic and moral reactions to disclosure by advisors. Results indicate that advisors do not expect decision makers to react drastically to disclosure. Also, advisors do not find deceiving morally more acceptable with disclosure than with no disclosure. Overall, disclosure neither hurts nor helps; deceptive advice and mistrust are equally frequent with as without disclosure
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)314-320
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume93
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Disclosure
Advisors
Decision maker
Experiment

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abstract = "We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. We measure how advisors expect decisionmakers to react to their advice in order to distinguish between strategic and moral reactions to disclosure by advisors. Results indicate that advisors do not expect decision makers to react drastically to disclosure. Also, advisors do not find deceiving morally more acceptable with disclosure than with no disclosure. Overall, disclosure neither hurts nor helps; deceptive advice and mistrust are equally frequent with as without disclosure",
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Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps. / Ismayilov, H.; Potters, J.J.M.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 93, 2013, p. 314-320.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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