Do managerial renumeration schemes reduce agency costs? Evidence from blockholder and market oriented corporate governance systems

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Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	234-247
Number of pages	13
Journal	Quarterly Journal of Economic Research (Viertelsjahrheft)
Volume	August
Publication status	Published - 2001

Cite this

@article{b67d72170797472a81bd790d1b58ac57,

title = "Do managerial renumeration schemes reduce agency costs? Evidence from blockholder and market oriented corporate governance systems",

author = "R. Crespi and C. Gispert and L.D.R. Renneboog",

note = "Pagination: 13",

year = "2001",

language = "English",

volume = "August",

pages = "234--247",

journal = "Quarterly Journal of Economic Research (Viertelsjahrheft)",

issn = "0340-1707",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do managerial renumeration schemes reduce agency costs? Evidence from blockholder and market oriented corporate governance systems

AU - Crespi, R.

AU - Gispert, C.

AU - Renneboog, L.D.R.

N1 - Pagination: 13

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

M3 - Article

SN - 0340-1707

VL - August

SP - 234

EP - 247

JO - Quarterly Journal of Economic Research (Viertelsjahrheft)

JF - Quarterly Journal of Economic Research (Viertelsjahrheft)

ER -