Dynamic games of international pollution control: A selective review

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

Abstract

A differential game is the natural framework of analysis for many problems in environmental economics. This chapter focuses on the game of international pollution control and more specifically on the game of climate change with one global stock of pollutants. The chapter has two main themes. First, the different noncooperative Nash equilibria (open loop, feedback, linear, nonlinear) are derived. In order to assess efficiency, the steady states are compared with the steady state of the full-cooperative outcome. The open-loop Nash equilibrium is better than the linear feedback Nash equilibrium, but a nonlinear feedback Nash equilibrium exists that is better than the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Second, the stability of international environmental agreements (or partial-cooperation Nash equilibria) is investigated, from different angles. The result in the static models that the membership game leads to a small stable coalition is confirmed in a dynamic model with an open-loop Nash equilibrium. The result that in an asymmetric situation transfers exist that sustain full cooperation under the threat that the coalition falls apart in case of deviations is extended to the dynamic context. The result in the static model that farsighted stability leads to a set of stable coalitions does not hold in the dynamic context if detection of a deviation takes time and climate damage is relatively important.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Dynamic Game Theory
EditorsT. Basar, G. Zaccour
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Pages703-728
ISBN (Print)9783319273358
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Fingerprint

Open-loop Nash equilibrium
Pollution control
Dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
Deviation
Climate
Damage
Threat
Environmental economics
Differential games
International environmental agreements
Farsighted stability
Climate change

Keywords

  • differential games
  • multiple nash equilibria
  • international pollution control
  • climate change
  • partial cooperation
  • international environmental agreements
  • stability
  • non-cooperative games
  • cooperative games
  • evolutionary games

Cite this

de Zeeuw, A. (2018). Dynamic games of international pollution control: A selective review. In T. Basar, & G. Zaccour (Eds.), Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (pp. 703-728). Cham: Springer.
de Zeeuw, Aart. / Dynamic games of international pollution control : A selective review. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. editor / T. Basar ; G. Zaccour. Cham : Springer, 2018. pp. 703-728
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de Zeeuw, A 2018, Dynamic games of international pollution control: A selective review. in T Basar & G Zaccour (eds), Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, Cham, pp. 703-728.

Dynamic games of international pollution control : A selective review. / de Zeeuw, Aart.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. ed. / T. Basar; G. Zaccour. Cham : Springer, 2018. p. 703-728.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

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de Zeeuw A. Dynamic games of international pollution control: A selective review. In Basar T, Zaccour G, editors, Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Cham: Springer. 2018. p. 703-728