Abstract
We examine the effect of the sending-o of a player on the goal-scoring rates
in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up.
in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |
Publisher | Economics |
Number of pages | 27 |
Volume | 2016-031 |
Publication status | Published - 22 Aug 2016 |
Publication series
Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2016-031 |
Keywords
- assocation football
- goal-scoring
- red card
- world cup foorball matches