### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Place of Publication | Tilburg |

Publisher | Microeconomics |

Number of pages | 20 |

Volume | 1996-79 |

Publication status | Published - 1996 |

### Publication series

Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
---|---|

Volume | 1996-79 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- game theory

### Cite this

*Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-79). Tilburg: Microeconomics.

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**Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game.** / Dufwenberg, M.; Gneezy, U.

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game

AU - Dufwenberg, M.

AU - Gneezy, U.

N1 - Pagination: 20

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game.Player 1may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.We find that most players 2 "give away" positive amounts (f6 on average), but their choices are independent of x.We explicitly measure the players' beliefs and find that many players 1 expect to get back no more than f x but nevertheless let player 2 split the f 20, and that the behavior by the players 2 is consistent with a theory of a guilt based on psychological game theory.

AB - We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game.Player 1may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.We find that most players 2 "give away" positive amounts (f6 on average), but their choices are independent of x.We explicitly measure the players' beliefs and find that many players 1 expect to get back no more than f x but nevertheless let player 2 split the f 20, and that the behavior by the players 2 is consistent with a theory of a guilt based on psychological game theory.

KW - game theory

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1996-79

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -