Abstract
The second part focusses on the incorporation of egalitarianism in cooperative games. There, players collectively gain revenues while taking into account the possibility to act in coalitions. An egalitarian negotiation procedure models how players iteratively take their coalitional egalitarian opportunities into consideration. A new and general solution concept based on the result of this procedure can be considered as a tradeoff between egalitarianism and coalitional rationality.
The third part of this dissertation is devoted to communication situations which arise when the players of a cooperative game are subject to cooperation restrictions as modeled by an undirected graph. This part analyzes the decomposition of network communication games into unanimity games and introduces a general class of network control values.
Original language  English 

Qualification  Doctor of Philosophy 
Awarding Institution 

Supervisors/Advisors 

Award date  31 Aug 2018 
Place of Publication  Tilburg 
Publisher  
Print ISBNs  9789056685652 
Publication status  Published  2018 
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Egalitarian allocation principles. / Dietzenbacher, Bas.
Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. 174 p.Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis › Scientific
TY  THES
T1  Egalitarian allocation principles
AU  Dietzenbacher, Bas
N1  CentER Dissertation Series Volume: 564
PY  2018
Y1  2018
N2  This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of fair allocation rules and their properties by studying egalitarian principles in models for allocation problems. The first part builds upon the foundations of bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. There, claimants have individual utility claims on an estate which is expressed in a set of attainable utility allocations. Bankruptcy rules prescribe for any bankruptcy problem an efficient and feasible payoff allocation. An egalitarian alternative for the proportional rule in this context is the constrained relative equal awards rule, which allocates payoffs as relatively equal as possible provided that no claimants are allocated more than their claims.The second part focusses on the incorporation of egalitarianism in cooperative games. There, players collectively gain revenues while taking into account the possibility to act in coalitions. An egalitarian negotiation procedure models how players iteratively take their coalitional egalitarian opportunities into consideration. A new and general solution concept based on the result of this procedure can be considered as a tradeoff between egalitarianism and coalitional rationality.The third part of this dissertation is devoted to communication situations which arise when the players of a cooperative game are subject to cooperation restrictions as modeled by an undirected graph. This part analyzes the decomposition of network communication games into unanimity games and introduces a general class of network control values.
AB  This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of fair allocation rules and their properties by studying egalitarian principles in models for allocation problems. The first part builds upon the foundations of bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. There, claimants have individual utility claims on an estate which is expressed in a set of attainable utility allocations. Bankruptcy rules prescribe for any bankruptcy problem an efficient and feasible payoff allocation. An egalitarian alternative for the proportional rule in this context is the constrained relative equal awards rule, which allocates payoffs as relatively equal as possible provided that no claimants are allocated more than their claims.The second part focusses on the incorporation of egalitarianism in cooperative games. There, players collectively gain revenues while taking into account the possibility to act in coalitions. An egalitarian negotiation procedure models how players iteratively take their coalitional egalitarian opportunities into consideration. A new and general solution concept based on the result of this procedure can be considered as a tradeoff between egalitarianism and coalitional rationality.The third part of this dissertation is devoted to communication situations which arise when the players of a cooperative game are subject to cooperation restrictions as modeled by an undirected graph. This part analyzes the decomposition of network communication games into unanimity games and introduces a general class of network control values.
M3  Doctoral Thesis
SN  9789056685652
T3  CentER Dissertation Series
PB  CentER, Center for Economic Research
CY  Tilburg
ER 