Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper studies egalitarianism in the context of nontransferable utility games by introducing and analyzing the egalitarian value. This new solution concept is based on an egalitarian negotiation procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and discuss the egalitarian value for the well-known Roth-Shafer examples. Moreover, we characterize the new value on the class of bankruptcy games and bargaining games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages15
Volume2017-023
Publication statusPublished - 26 Apr 2017

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2017-023

Fingerprint

Non-transferable utility
Egalitarianism
Bargaining games
Bankruptcy
Solution concepts

Keywords

  • egalitarianism
  • NTU-games
  • egalitarian procedure
  • egalitarian value
  • egalitarian stability
  • constrained relative equal awards rule

Cite this

Dietzenbacher, B., Borm, P., & Hendrickx, R. (2017). Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2017-023). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Dietzenbacher, Bas ; Borm, Peter ; Hendrickx, Ruud. / Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2017. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Dietzenbacher, B, Borm, P & Hendrickx, R 2017 'Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2017-023, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games. / Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2017. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2017-023).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Dietzenbacher B, Borm P, Hendrickx R. Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2017 Apr 26. (CentER Discussion Paper).