Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions

P. Pezanis-Christou, A. Sadrieh

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders.To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment.In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller s revenues and deviations from equilibrium).However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages35
Volume2003-58
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-58

Fingerprint

Bid
First-price auction
Experiment
Bidding behavior
Deviation
Prediction
First-price sealed-bid auction
Auctions
Experimental design
Strategic behavior
Asymmetric bidders
Sophistication
Revenue
Risk-averse
Individual behaviour
Seller

Keywords

  • auctions
  • bidding
  • strategy
  • behavioural science
  • general equilibrium
  • risk

Cite this

Pezanis-Christou, P., & Sadrieh, A. (2003). Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-58). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Pezanis-Christou, P. ; Sadrieh, A. / Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Pezanis-Christou, P & Sadrieh, A 2003 'Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-58, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions. / Pezanis-Christou, P.; Sadrieh, A.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-58).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Pezanis-Christou P, Sadrieh A. Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).