Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

Riccardo Ghidoni, Sigrid Suetens

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Abstract

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages61
Volume2019-016
Publication statusPublished - 8 May 2019

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2019-016

Fingerprint

Empirical evidence
Sequential game
Incentives
Strategic uncertainty
Experiment
Decision making
Repeated prisoner's dilemma
Interaction

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • infinitely repeated games
  • sequential prisoner's dilemma
  • strategic uncertainty
  • experiment

Cite this

Ghidoni, R., & Suetens, S. (2019). Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-016). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Ghidoni, Riccardo ; Suetens, Sigrid. / Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ghidoni, R & Suetens, S 2019 'Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2019-016, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games. / Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-016).

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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KW - sequential prisoner's dilemma

KW - strategic uncertainty

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Ghidoni R, Suetens S. Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2019 May 8. (CentER Discussion Paper).

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