Abstract
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |
Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
Number of pages | 61 |
Volume | 2019-016 |
Publication status | Published - 8 May 2019 |
Publication series
Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2019-016 |
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Keywords
- cooperation
- infinitely repeated games
- sequential prisoner's dilemma
- strategic uncertainty
- experiment
Cite this
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Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games. / Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid.
Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-016).Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output
TY - UNPB
T1 - Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games
AU - Ghidoni, Riccardo
AU - Suetens, Sigrid
N1 - CentER Discussion Paper Nr. 2019-016
PY - 2019/5/8
Y1 - 2019/5/8
N2 - Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.
AB - Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.
KW - cooperation
KW - infinitely repeated games
KW - sequential prisoner's dilemma
KW - strategic uncertainty
KW - experiment
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 2019-016
T3 - CentER Discussion Paper
BT - Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games
PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research
CY - Tilburg
ER -