Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence

M.A. Fonseca, W. Müller, H.T. Normann

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In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence.Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • Commitment
  • Endogenous timing
  • Experimental economics
  • Cournot
  • Stackel- berg


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