@techreport{ddc44fc68a7a4320bfb2b30cb8be0822,
title = "Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence",
abstract = "In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence.Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.",
keywords = "Commitment, Endogenous timing, Experimental economics, Cournot, Stackel- berg",
author = "M.A. Fonseca and W. M{\"u}ller and H.T. Normann",
note = "Pagination: 15",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
volume = "2005-77",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}