TY - JOUR
T1 - Energy trading and the exchange of information between supervisors
T2 - Effectiveness of fragmented supervision and information sharing
AU - Hiemstra, Liebrich
PY - 2020/11/30
Y1 - 2020/11/30
N2 - Energy companies trading in derivatives which have a value based on an energy product (‘energy trading’) are subjected to a fragmented regulatory framework. They are supervised by a multitude of authorities on a national and European level. These authorities cooperate horizontally (between EU agencies or between national regulatory authorities – NRAs) or vertically (between EU agencies and NRAs) and in a formal and informal way. They share information on energy trading to detect market abuse. This article aims to provide insight on the effectiveness of supervisory activities within the energy trading landscape. In doing so, the obligation for energy companies to report fundamental data on the derivatives they trade in is used for illustrative purposes and explained in light of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (MiFID II and MiFIR) and the regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT). The article finishes with a conclusion which advocates the necessity of information sharing and professional secrecy in the current regulatory landscape and intends to contribute to a discussion on the effectiveness of information sharing within an international context.
AB - Energy companies trading in derivatives which have a value based on an energy product (‘energy trading’) are subjected to a fragmented regulatory framework. They are supervised by a multitude of authorities on a national and European level. These authorities cooperate horizontally (between EU agencies or between national regulatory authorities – NRAs) or vertically (between EU agencies and NRAs) and in a formal and informal way. They share information on energy trading to detect market abuse. This article aims to provide insight on the effectiveness of supervisory activities within the energy trading landscape. In doing so, the obligation for energy companies to report fundamental data on the derivatives they trade in is used for illustrative purposes and explained in light of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (MiFID II and MiFIR) and the regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT). The article finishes with a conclusion which advocates the necessity of information sharing and professional secrecy in the current regulatory landscape and intends to contribute to a discussion on the effectiveness of information sharing within an international context.
KW - Energy trading
KW - Market abuse
KW - information exchange
KW - professional secrecy
KW - effective supervision
KW - reporting obligations
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096978069&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/02646811.2020.1841400
DO - 10.1080/02646811.2020.1841400
M3 - Article
SN - 0264-6811
SP - 1
EP - 24
JO - Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law
JF - Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law
ER -