Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry

A dynamic analysis

T.L. Feenstra

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

227 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The effects on the environment of international interdependencies between countries are manifold. One concern is the occurrence of environmental policy competition, or the distortion of environmental policy measures for strategic trade reasons. This thesis analyses environmental regulation of polluting firms which sell their output on an international market characterised by imperfect competition. Governments value environmental quality as well as profits for their domestic oligopolists and behave strategically. The analysis compares environmental taxes with standards on emissions. Differential game models are used to accurately model the accumulation of capital through investment. Equilibria with feedback investment strategies lead to ambiguity in the choice of instruments which can not be found in the multistage models common in the literature on strategic trade. The investment behaviour of a firm subject to a system of permits that are transferable over time is the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter five is concerned with carbondioxide sequestration by forests. In the last two chapters, transboundary pollution and trade are combined to analyse the distortions of environmental policy instruments and firms' investment in environmental capital.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Verheyen, P.A., Promotor
  • de Zeeuw, Aart, Promotor
  • Kort, Peter, Co-promotor
Award date8 May 1998
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056680366
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Fingerprint

Dynamic analysis
Rivalry
Environmental policy instruments
Strategic trade
Environmental policy
Firm investment
Investment behavior
Environmental taxes
Environmental regulation
Transboundary pollution
Investment strategy
Environmental quality
Differential games
Policy measures
Government
Profit
Interdependencies
Imperfect competition
International markets

Cite this

Feenstra, T. L. (1998). Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry: A dynamic analysis. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Feenstra, T.L.. / Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry : A dynamic analysis. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1998. 208 p.
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Feenstra, TL 1998, 'Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry: A dynamic analysis', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry : A dynamic analysis. / Feenstra, T.L.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1998. 208 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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T1 - Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry

T2 - A dynamic analysis

AU - Feenstra, T.L.

PY - 1998

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AB - The effects on the environment of international interdependencies between countries are manifold. One concern is the occurrence of environmental policy competition, or the distortion of environmental policy measures for strategic trade reasons. This thesis analyses environmental regulation of polluting firms which sell their output on an international market characterised by imperfect competition. Governments value environmental quality as well as profits for their domestic oligopolists and behave strategically. The analysis compares environmental taxes with standards on emissions. Differential game models are used to accurately model the accumulation of capital through investment. Equilibria with feedback investment strategies lead to ambiguity in the choice of instruments which can not be found in the multistage models common in the literature on strategic trade. The investment behaviour of a firm subject to a system of permits that are transferable over time is the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter five is concerned with carbondioxide sequestration by forests. In the last two chapters, transboundary pollution and trade are combined to analyse the distortions of environmental policy instruments and firms' investment in environmental capital.

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T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

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Feenstra TL. Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry: A dynamic analysis. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1998. 208 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).