Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints

G. van der Laan, Dolf Talman, Z. Yang

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Abstract

We reexamine the well-known assignment market model in a more general and more practical environment where agents may be financially constrained. These constraints will be shown to have an important impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. We prove that a price adjustment process will either find a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium price vector, or exclusively validate the nonexistence of equilibrium
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages13
Volume2018-046
Publication statusPublished - 12 Nov 2018

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2018-046

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Keywords

  • assignment
  • auction
  • budget constraint
  • Walrasian equilibrium

Cite this

van der Laan, G., Talman, D., & Yang, Z. (2018). Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2018-046). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.