Equilibrium selection in team games

E.E.C. van Damme

Equilibrium selection in team games

E.E.C. van Damme

Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Abstract

It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payoff function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may differ from the Pareto dominant one.

Original language	English
Publisher	Unknown Publisher
Number of pages	14
Volume	1995-125
Publication status	Published - 1995

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	1995-125

Keywords

game theory

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125

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VL - 1995-125

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Equilibrium selection in team games

PB - Unknown Publisher

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Equilibrium selection in team games

Abstract

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Keywords

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