Equilibrium selection in team games

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Abstract

It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payoff function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may differ from the Pareto dominant one.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages14
Volume1995-125
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-125

Keywords

  • game theory

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    van Damme, E. E. C. (1995). Equilibrium selection in team games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-125). Unknown Publisher.