Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

K.K. Kultti

Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

K.K. Kultti

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

428 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	CentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages	10
Volume	1997-57
Publication status	Published - 1997

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	1997-57

Keywords

Auctions
posted prices
random matching.

Access to Document

57

Cite this

@techreport{fad8afd3eb424a0d8d608ec21401a444,

title = "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices",

abstract = "We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.",

keywords = "Auctions, posted prices, random matching.",

author = "K.K. Kultti",

note = "Pagination: 10",

year = "1997",

language = "English",

volume = "1997-57",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

AU - Kultti, K.K.

N1 - Pagination: 10

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.

AB - We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.

KW - Auctions

KW - posted prices

KW - random matching.

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1997-57

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this