Competition law - or antitrust law, as it is called in the United States - is a field of law to which economic concepts, such as "restriction of competition" and "anti-competitive effect", are of central importance. This thesis analyses a number of such concepts, both from an economic and a legal perspective. The first part reviews the economic literature on the competitive effects of vertical agreements (agreements concluded between firms operating at different levels of the production or distribution chain) and studies the role of economic analysis in the application of the EU competition rules towards such agreements. The second part of the thesis provides three applications of the game-theoretic analysis of restrictive practices. In two chapters, the rationale behind a particular type of restrictive practice, namely resale price maintenance, is tested in specific market circumstances. The final chapter is about cartel formation in industries where firms are uncertain about each other's pricing incentives. In a specific model, the general conception is tested that the likelihood of firms forming a cartel is greater in concentrated industries than in industries with many firms.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||25 Jun 2001|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 2001|