Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition

Ekaterina Neretina

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

37 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This thesis consists of three chapters and it highlights the implications of limited competition in Financial Economics. The first chapter shows negative externalities from corporate lobbying on the market value of competitor companies that do lobby themselves. It also demonstrates that the competitors do not lobby when they lack voting power to support lawmakers in the elections, or when they fail to coordinate in trade associations. Two other chapters focus on implications of limited competition in intermediation industries. The second chapter shows that segmentation in the corporate bond market results in limited choice of underwriters to the issuers, providing underwriters with high bargaining power and oligopolistic rents. The third chapter shows that dominant plaintiff law firms that charge premium fees for their services do not improve the settlement outcomes for their clients, but merely use their ability to select large and profitable lawsuits.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Renneboog, Luc, Promotor
  • Ferrell, A., Promotor, External person
Award date3 Jun 2019
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs978 90 5668 591 1
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Fingerprint

Political competition
Lobbies
Competitors
Underwriters
Corporate finance
Political economy
Bargaining power
Industry
Market value
Lobbying
Corporate bonds
Financial economics
Elections
Law firms
Lawsuit
Segmentation
Intermediation
Fees
Trade associations
Negative externalities

Cite this

Neretina, E. (2019). Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Neretina, Ekaterina. / Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. 160 p.
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Neretina, E 2019, 'Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition. / Neretina, Ekaterina.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. 160 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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VL - 590

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

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Neretina E. Essays in corporate finance, political economy, and competition. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. 160 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).