This thesis contains five essays in the theory of industrial organization and management strategy. An introduction makes the main ideas accessible to non-specialists by presenting the essays as fictitious cases. The first essay investigates strategic disclosure of verifiable information. The disclosed information concerns a hidden action, and the transmission of information takes place in a noisy environment. The second essay explores how search costs and informational asymmetries influence the possibilities for entry in markets for search goods. The model that is used analyzes signaling with common information. The third essay presents a principal-agent model in which the agent enjoys working. The principal, instead of designing a pecuniary incentive scheme, can appeal to the agent's private benefits by giving him a say in the job the agent has to do. The fourth essay applies this idea in order to study the strategic impact of organizational structure. Possible linkages between internal organization and market strategy are highlighted. The last essay focuses on the prices selected by a monopolist who sells a durable good and repairs it in the case of breakdown. The monopolist can circumvent inefficiencies by inviting a competitor in the repair market or by leasing the good instead of selling it.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||26 Apr 1996|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 1996|