Essays in microeconomic theory

C. Schottmuller

Essays in microeconomic theory

C. Schottmuller

Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis

425 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The fourth paper explains why it might not be welfare maximizing to incentivize doctors to take costs of treatment into account in their prescription decisions. By extending the classic cheap talk model, it is shown that cost incentives reduce the information transmitted from patient to doctor which leads to a welfare loss.

Original language	English
Qualification	Doctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution	Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors	Boone, Jan, Promotor
Award date	21 Jun 2012
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	CentER, Center for Economic Research
Print ISBNs	9789056683177
Publication status	Published - 2012

Access to Document

ThesisFinal published version, 947 KB

Cite this

@phdthesis{e45c88b4c76e43e78f9f597818a5fee9,

title = "Essays in microeconomic theory",

abstract = "The fourth paper explains why it might not be welfare maximizing to incentivize doctors to take costs of treatment into account in their prescription decisions. By extending the classic cheap talk model, it is shown that cost incentives reduce the information transmitted from patient to doctor which leads to a welfare loss.",

author = "C. Schottmuller",

year = "2012",

language = "English",

isbn = "9789056683177",

series = "CentER Dissertation Series",

publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",

school = "Tilburg University",

}

TY - THES

T1 - Essays in microeconomic theory

AU - Schottmuller, C.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - The fourth paper explains why it might not be welfare maximizing to incentivize doctors to take costs of treatment into account in their prescription decisions. By extending the classic cheap talk model, it is shown that cost incentives reduce the information transmitted from patient to doctor which leads to a welfare loss.

AB - The fourth paper explains why it might not be welfare maximizing to incentivize doctors to take costs of treatment into account in their prescription decisions. By extending the classic cheap talk model, it is shown that cost incentives reduce the information transmitted from patient to doctor which leads to a welfare loss.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9789056683177

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Essays in microeconomic theory

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this