Essays in political economy and resource economic: A macroeconomic approach

This dissertation consists of four chapters in Political Economy and Resource Economics from a macroeconomic perspective. This collection of works emphasizes the endogenous nature of institutions and their importance for economic development. The four chapters revolve around two central questions: 1. Why do inefficient institutions emerge and persist over time? And, 2. What are the dynamic consequences of inefficient institutions?
The first two chapters investigate these two central questions with the use of political economy models in which agents have unequal access to economic resources and political power. The first chapter focuses on the endogenous emergence of public law enforcement during the process of economic development, and the role of law enforcement in the protection of property rights. The second chapter concentrates on the cohesiveness of institutions, and its effect on the provision of productive public services and the inter-temporal redistribution of political power and economic rents.
The last two chapters of the dissertation direct their attention to the consequences of imperfectly protected---yet evolving---property rights, on the dynamic management of non-renewable natural resources. The third chapter investigates how the imperfect protection of property rights, over the remaining stock of a non-renewable resource and the revenues from exploiting it, affect the pace of depletion of the resource. The last chapter analyzes the effects of a mitigable risk of expropriation on the pace of depletion of a non-renewable resource and the investment in capacity to exploit it.