Essays in political economy and resource economic

A macroeconomic approach

Mauricio Rodriguez Acosta

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

553 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This dissertation consists of four chapters in Political Economy and Resource Economics from a macroeconomic perspective. This collection of works emphasizes the endogenous nature of institutions and their importance for economic development. The four chapters revolve around two central questions: 1. Why do inefficient institutions emerge and persist over time? And, 2. What are the dynamic consequences of inefficient institutions?
The first two chapters investigate these two central questions with the use of political economy models in which agents have unequal access to economic resources and political power. The first chapter focuses on the endogenous emergence of public law enforcement during the process of economic development, and the role of law enforcement in the protection of property rights. The second chapter concentrates on the cohesiveness of institutions, and its effect on the provision of productive public services and the inter-temporal redistribution of political power and economic rents.
The last two chapters of the dissertation direct their attention to the consequences of imperfectly protected---yet evolving---property rights, on the dynamic management of non-renewable natural resources. The third chapter investigates how the imperfect protection of property rights, over the remaining stock of a non-renewable resource and the revenues from exploiting it, affect the pace of depletion of the resource. The last chapter analyzes the effects of a mitigable risk of expropriation on the pace of depletion of a non-renewable resource and the investment in capacity to exploit it.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Smulders, Sjak, Promotor
  • Oechslin, Manuel, Promotor
Award date3 Jun 2016
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs978 90 5668 473 0
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Macroeconomics
Resource economics
Property rights
Political economy
Economic development
Non-renewable resources
Law enforcement
Depletion
Political power
Economic rent
Resources
Natural resources
Revenue
Public services
Redistribution
Economic resources
Expropriation
Political economics

Cite this

Rodriguez Acosta, M. (2016). Essays in political economy and resource economic: A macroeconomic approach. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio. / Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2016. 212 p.
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abstract = "This dissertation consists of four chapters in Political Economy and Resource Economics from a macroeconomic perspective. This collection of works emphasizes the endogenous nature of institutions and their importance for economic development. The four chapters revolve around two central questions: 1. Why do inefficient institutions emerge and persist over time? And, 2. What are the dynamic consequences of inefficient institutions? The first two chapters investigate these two central questions with the use of political economy models in which agents have unequal access to economic resources and political power. The first chapter focuses on the endogenous emergence of public law enforcement during the process of economic development, and the role of law enforcement in the protection of property rights. The second chapter concentrates on the cohesiveness of institutions, and its effect on the provision of productive public services and the inter-temporal redistribution of political power and economic rents. The last two chapters of the dissertation direct their attention to the consequences of imperfectly protected---yet evolving---property rights, on the dynamic management of non-renewable natural resources. The third chapter investigates how the imperfect protection of property rights, over the remaining stock of a non-renewable resource and the revenues from exploiting it, affect the pace of depletion of the resource. The last chapter analyzes the effects of a mitigable risk of expropriation on the pace of depletion of a non-renewable resource and the investment in capacity to exploit it.",
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year = "2016",
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Rodriguez Acosta, M 2016, 'Essays in political economy and resource economic: A macroeconomic approach', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach. / Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2016. 212 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

TY - THES

T1 - Essays in political economy and resource economic

T2 - A macroeconomic approach

AU - Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

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AB - This dissertation consists of four chapters in Political Economy and Resource Economics from a macroeconomic perspective. This collection of works emphasizes the endogenous nature of institutions and their importance for economic development. The four chapters revolve around two central questions: 1. Why do inefficient institutions emerge and persist over time? And, 2. What are the dynamic consequences of inefficient institutions? The first two chapters investigate these two central questions with the use of political economy models in which agents have unequal access to economic resources and political power. The first chapter focuses on the endogenous emergence of public law enforcement during the process of economic development, and the role of law enforcement in the protection of property rights. The second chapter concentrates on the cohesiveness of institutions, and its effect on the provision of productive public services and the inter-temporal redistribution of political power and economic rents. The last two chapters of the dissertation direct their attention to the consequences of imperfectly protected---yet evolving---property rights, on the dynamic management of non-renewable natural resources. The third chapter investigates how the imperfect protection of property rights, over the remaining stock of a non-renewable resource and the revenues from exploiting it, affect the pace of depletion of the resource. The last chapter analyzes the effects of a mitigable risk of expropriation on the pace of depletion of a non-renewable resource and the investment in capacity to exploit it.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 978 90 5668 473 0

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Rodriguez Acosta M. Essays in political economy and resource economic: A macroeconomic approach. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2016. 212 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).