Abstract
This PhD thesis comprises three essays on banking regulations. The first chapter
examines how relative performance evaluation in bankers' compensation can lead
to risky behavior that exacerbates systemic risk. Despite its significance, current
regulations fail to address this aspect of compensation. The second essay discusses
the trade-offs in disclosing regulatory assessment models, balancing transparency
with the risk of banks manipulating their reports. It finds that regulators can
benefit from disclosing partial information about the assessment models, which
effectively diverts banks' manipulation efforts away from more critical cases.
The third essay analyzes the interplay among capital requirements, supervisory
review, and market discipline in curbing banks’ risk-taking behaviors
examines how relative performance evaluation in bankers' compensation can lead
to risky behavior that exacerbates systemic risk. Despite its significance, current
regulations fail to address this aspect of compensation. The second essay discusses
the trade-offs in disclosing regulatory assessment models, balancing transparency
with the risk of banks manipulating their reports. It finds that regulators can
benefit from disclosing partial information about the assessment models, which
effectively diverts banks' manipulation efforts away from more critical cases.
The third essay analyzes the interplay among capital requirements, supervisory
review, and market discipline in curbing banks’ risk-taking behaviors
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisors/Advisors |
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| Award date | 28 Oct 2024 |
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | |
| Print ISBNs | 978 90 5668 753 3 |
| Publication status | Published - 2024 |