Essays on banking regulations

Shuo Zhao

doi:10.26116/tisem.30823462

Essays on banking regulations

Shuo Zhao

Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis

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Abstract

This PhD thesis comprises three essays on banking regulations. The first chapter examines how relative performance evaluation in bankers' compensation can lead to risky behavior that exacerbates systemic risk. Despite its significance, current regulations fail to address this aspect of compensation. The second essay discusses the trade-offs in disclosing regulatory assessment models, balancing transparency with the risk of banks manipulating their reports. It finds that regulators can benefit from disclosing partial information about the assessment models, which effectively diverts banks' manipulation efforts away from more critical cases. The third essay analyzes the interplay among capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline in curbing banks’ risk-taking behaviors

Original language	English
Qualification	Doctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution	Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors	Braggion, Fabio, Promotor Castiglionesi, Fabio, Co-promotor Mahieux, Lucas, Co-promotor
Award date	28 Oct 2024
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	CentER, Center for Economic Research
Print ISBNs	978 90 5668 753 3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26116/tisem.30823462
Publication status	Published - 2024

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title = "Essays on banking regulations",

abstract = "This PhD thesis comprises three essays on banking regulations. The first chapter examines how relative performance evaluation in bankers' compensation can lead to risky behavior that exacerbates systemic risk. Despite its significance, current regulations fail to address this aspect of compensation. The second essay discusses the trade-offs in disclosing regulatory assessment models, balancing transparency with the risk of banks manipulating their reports. It finds that regulators can benefit from disclosing partial information about the assessment models, which effectively diverts banks' manipulation efforts away from more critical cases. The third essay analyzes the interplay among capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline in curbing banks{\textquoteright} risk-taking behaviors",

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AB - This PhD thesis comprises three essays on banking regulations. The first chapter examines how relative performance evaluation in bankers' compensation can lead to risky behavior that exacerbates systemic risk. Despite its significance, current regulations fail to address this aspect of compensation. The second essay discusses the trade-offs in disclosing regulatory assessment models, balancing transparency with the risk of banks manipulating their reports. It finds that regulators can benefit from disclosing partial information about the assessment models, which effectively diverts banks' manipulation efforts away from more critical cases. The third essay analyzes the interplay among capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline in curbing banks’ risk-taking behaviors

U2 - 10.26116/tisem.30823462

DO - 10.26116/tisem.30823462

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 978 90 5668 753 3

VL - 751

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Essays on banking regulations

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