This thesis consists of three chapters, one at the intersection between corporate governance and corporate law, one at the intersection between corporate governance and the management literature, and one focusing on the repercussions of regulation on asset prices. The first chapter studies the net shareholder wealth effect of a specific legal arrangement within the U.S. legal system, the shareholders' right to sue the company and its officers, and documents that this effect is, on average, negative. The second chapter explores the market perception of top management team diversity. The empirical analysis relies on a novel, text-based measure of team diversity, and shows that the market systematically underestimates the financial performance of firms with a diverse top management team. Finally, the last chapter investigates whether uninformed institutional investors’ demand can affect asset prices. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered changes of bank trusts’ fiduciary duty standard in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to institutions’ preferences, and documents that uninformed institutional demand can have a large and prolonged impact on stock prices.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||28 Aug 2018|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|