Abstract
The three essays collected in this PhD thesis: the first two on equity incentives and the third one on share pledging in China. The first essay shows regional investor protection has a significant restraining effect on managers self-interested behavior, and this restraining effect can have a positive effect on corporate growth and performance. The second essay finds that the anti-corruption campaign in China has increased managers’ risk-aversion, and the risk aversion-related mechanisms to mitigate managers’ motivation to manipulate firms’ performance in SOEs, less competitive industries and high institutional ownership firms. The third essay demonstrates tighter regulatory requirements can effectively reduce firms’ crash risk, relax financial constraints, reduce bankruptcy risk, and mitigate controlling shareholder expropriation of minority shareholders wealth via tunnelling. These effects significantly alleviate the destructive effect of controlling shareholders’ activities on firm and increase firm value.
| Original language | English |
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| Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
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| Award date | 18 Sept 2023 |
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
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| Print ISBNs | 978 90 5668 710 6 |
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| Publication status | Published - 2023 |