Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation

J.A. Jansen

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

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Abstract

The thesis contains three essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. The first essay analyzes a problem of optimal regulatory design. Key feature of the problem is that there exists asymmetric information between the regulator and the industry concerning the costs of producing complementary products. The regulatory problem is to organize the industry such that firms' incentives for truthful information revelation and participation are obtained at minimal social cost. The second and third essays analyse problems of dynamic competition in research and development. A special feature is that firms learn about their cost of development while they invest in research. The interaction between the firms' incentives to acquire and communicate information, and their incentives to develop the innovation, is studied. The second essay focuses on the incentive effects of revenue sharing, and the verifiability of acquired information. The focus of the third essay is on effects of disclosure regulation, and correlation development costs on the firms' incentives to invest and disclose information.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • van Damme, Eric, Promotor
  • Bolton, P., Promotor
Award date24 Jan 2000
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056680625
Publication statusPublished - 2000

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Incentives
Innovation
Costs
Industry
Asymmetric information
Revenue sharing
Complementary products
Social costs
Information revelation
Participation
Dynamic competition
Verifiability
Incentive effect
Disclosure regulation
Interaction

Cite this

Jansen, J. A. (2000). Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Jansen, J.A.. / Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 143 p.
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author = "J.A. Jansen",
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Jansen, JA 2000, 'Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. / Jansen, J.A.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 143 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

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T1 - Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation

AU - Jansen, J.A.

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - The thesis contains three essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. The first essay analyzes a problem of optimal regulatory design. Key feature of the problem is that there exists asymmetric information between the regulator and the industry concerning the costs of producing complementary products. The regulatory problem is to organize the industry such that firms' incentives for truthful information revelation and participation are obtained at minimal social cost. The second and third essays analyse problems of dynamic competition in research and development. A special feature is that firms learn about their cost of development while they invest in research. The interaction between the firms' incentives to acquire and communicate information, and their incentives to develop the innovation, is studied. The second essay focuses on the incentive effects of revenue sharing, and the verifiability of acquired information. The focus of the third essay is on effects of disclosure regulation, and correlation development costs on the firms' incentives to invest and disclose information.

AB - The thesis contains three essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. The first essay analyzes a problem of optimal regulatory design. Key feature of the problem is that there exists asymmetric information between the regulator and the industry concerning the costs of producing complementary products. The regulatory problem is to organize the industry such that firms' incentives for truthful information revelation and participation are obtained at minimal social cost. The second and third essays analyse problems of dynamic competition in research and development. A special feature is that firms learn about their cost of development while they invest in research. The interaction between the firms' incentives to acquire and communicate information, and their incentives to develop the innovation, is studied. The second essay focuses on the incentive effects of revenue sharing, and the verifiability of acquired information. The focus of the third essay is on effects of disclosure regulation, and correlation development costs on the firms' incentives to invest and disclose information.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9056680625

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Jansen JA. Essays on incentives in regulation and innovation. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 143 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).