Essays on two-dimensional signaling games

H.T. Apakan

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

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Abstract

This dissertation studies various two-dimensional signaling games. It introduces and uses equilibrium refinements to analyze such games. In Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, (one-sender) two-audience costly signaling games are studied. Chapter 2 introduces two equilibrium refinements for a class of two-audience private signaling games. Chapter 3 studies a costly gift-giving game with two audiences and investigates how observability of gifts affects pro-social behavior. Chapter 4 studies a costly persuasion game with uncertain intentions of the sender and investigates how truthful information sharing is affected by the intentions of the sender.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • van Damme, Eric, Promotor
  • Müller, Wieland, Promotor
Award date20 Oct 2021
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs978 90 5668 664 2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

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