Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations

M.I. Ochea, Aart de Zeeuw

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We study the success of generalised trigger strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations where the performance of these strategies is derived from asymmetric n-player prisoners’ dilemmas. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space—i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction—such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)837-854
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume62
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015

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reciprocity
tit-for-tat
prisoner dilemma
cost
co-operation
parameter
Trigger strategies
Evolutionary dynamics
Costs and benefits
Social dilemma
Prisoners' dilemma
Evolution of cooperation
Attractor

Keywords

  • International environemtnal negotiations
  • Tit-for-tat
  • Replicator dynamics
  • Asymmetric prisones' dilemma

Cite this

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Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations. / Ochea, M.I.; de Zeeuw, Aart.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 62, No. 4, 12.2015, p. 837-854.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Ochea, M.I.

AU - de Zeeuw, Aart

PY - 2015/12

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KW - International environemtnal negotiations

KW - Tit-for-tat

KW - Replicator dynamics

KW - Asymmetric prisones' dilemma

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DO - 10.1007/s10640-014-9841-5

M3 - Article

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JO - Environmental and Resource Economics

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SN - 0924-6460

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