Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations

M.I. Ochea, Aart de Zeeuw

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


We study the success of generalised trigger strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations where the performance of these strategies is derived from asymmetric n-player prisoners’ dilemmas. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space—i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction—such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)837-854
JournalEnvironmental & Resource Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015


  • International environemtnal negotiations
  • Tit-for-tat
  • Replicator dynamics
  • Asymmetric prisones' dilemma


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