Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

E.E.C. van Damme, J. Weibull

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Abstract

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intended. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2£ 2-coordination games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages14
Volume1998-94
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1998-94

Fingerprint

Mutation
Cost control
Adaptive dynamics
Pure strategies
Coordination games
Costs

Keywords

  • games
  • probability

Cite this

van Damme, E. E. C., & Weibull, J. (1998). Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-94). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
van Damme, E.E.C. ; Weibull, J. / Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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van Damme, EEC & Weibull, J 1998 'Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1998-94, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs. / van Damme, E.E.C.; Weibull, J.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-94).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

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N2 - Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intended. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2£ 2-coordination games.

AB - Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intended. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2£ 2-coordination games.

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KW - probability

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VL - 1998-94

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van Damme EEC, Weibull J. Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper).