Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences

Xue Xu

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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Abstract

This thesis consists of three chapters in experimental economics. It involves various dimensions in which laboratory experiments can play a role: testing the validity of a game theory, helping understand institutions, and measuring (the change in) social preferences. It relates to the effects of different institutions on cooperation and social preferences. Chapter 2 studies to what extent an overlapping membership structure, which in theory affects the incentives of short-lived players, is conducive to cooperation. Chapter 3 examines whether the presence of decentralized punishment, especially the possibility of retaliating a centralized enforcer, has an impact on the decisions of the enforcer and group cooperation. Chapter 4 studies whether interactions with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences in altruism and whether the nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Potters, Jan, Promotor
  • Suetens, Sigrid, Co-promotor
Award date15 Jan 2018
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs978 90 5668 547 8
Publication statusPublished - 2018

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outgroup
experiment
Group
game theory
altruism
laboratory experiment
interaction
group membership
penalty
incentive
economics

Cite this

Xu, X. (2018). Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Xu, Xue. / Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. 118 p.
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note = "CentER Dissertation Series Volume: 546",
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Xu, X 2018, 'Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences. / Xu, Xue.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. 118 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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AU - Xu, Xue

N1 - CentER Dissertation Series Volume: 546

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - This thesis consists of three chapters in experimental economics. It involves various dimensions in which laboratory experiments can play a role: testing the validity of a game theory, helping understand institutions, and measuring (the change in) social preferences. It relates to the effects of different institutions on cooperation and social preferences. Chapter 2 studies to what extent an overlapping membership structure, which in theory affects the incentives of short-lived players, is conducive to cooperation. Chapter 3 examines whether the presence of decentralized punishment, especially the possibility of retaliating a centralized enforcer, has an impact on the decisions of the enforcer and group cooperation. Chapter 4 studies whether interactions with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences in altruism and whether the nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.

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Xu X. Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. 118 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).