Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences

Xue Xu

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

177 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This thesis consists of three chapters in experimental economics. It involves various dimensions in which laboratory experiments can play a role: testing the validity of a game theory, helping understand institutions, and measuring (the change in) social preferences. It relates to the effects of different institutions on cooperation and social preferences. Chapter 2 studies to what extent an overlapping membership structure, which in theory affects the incentives of short-lived players, is conducive to cooperation. Chapter 3 examines whether the presence of decentralized punishment, especially the possibility of retaliating a centralized enforcer, has an impact on the decisions of the enforcer and group cooperation. Chapter 4 studies whether interactions with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences in altruism and whether the nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Potters, Jan, Promotor
  • Suetens, Sigrid, Co-promotor
Award date15 Jan 2018
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs978 90 5668 547 8
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Xu, X. (2018). Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences. CentER, Center for Economic Research.