Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an effort to explicate the concept of explanatory power in a Bayesian framework by constructing explanatory measures. It has been argued that those measures should not violate the principle of explanatory justice, which states that explanatory power cannot be extended “for free.” I argue, by formal means, that one recent measure claiming to be immune from explanatory injustice fails to be so. I end by concluding that the explanatory justice criticism can be dissolved, given a natural interpretation of the concept of negative explanatory power.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 442-454 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2018 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Explanatory Power
- Bayesian Framework
- Explanatory Justice