Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations

J.R. van den Brink, R.P. Gilles

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study under which conditions decision makers exercise their own authority and accept their superiors' authority.We distinguish two types of behavior.First, we investigate a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing explicit exercise of authority. Second, we consider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to authority even though such authority is not enforced explicitly.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherVakgroep CentER
Number of pages40
Volume2005-75
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-75

Fingerprint

Hierarchical organization
Authority
Decision maker
Exercise
Assets

Keywords

  • Authority
  • Hierarchy
  • Game Theory
  • Social situations

Cite this

van den Brink, J. R., & Gilles, R. P. (2005). Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-75). Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER.
van den Brink, J.R. ; Gilles, R.P. / Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations. Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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van den Brink, JR & Gilles, RP 2005 'Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2005-75, Vakgroep CentER, Tilburg.

Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations. / van den Brink, J.R.; Gilles, R.P.

Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-75).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study under which conditions decision makers exercise their own authority and accept their superiors' authority.We distinguish two types of behavior.First, we investigate a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing explicit exercise of authority. Second, we consider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to authority even though such authority is not enforced explicitly.

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KW - Hierarchy

KW - Game Theory

KW - Social situations

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VL - 2005-75

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations

PB - Vakgroep CentER

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van den Brink JR, Gilles RP. Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations. Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER. 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).