Fall back equilibria

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.

In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)372-379
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume223
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Bimatrix Games
Nash Equilibrium
Experiments
Refinement
Experiment
Concepts
Nash equilibrium
Bimatrix games
Equilibrium refinements

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title = "Fall back equilibria",
abstract = "Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.",
author = "J. Kleppe and P.E.M. Borm and R.L.P. Hendrickx",
note = "Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2008-031",
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language = "English",
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pages = "372--379",
journal = "European Journal of Operational Research",
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Fall back equilibria. / Kleppe, J.; Borm, P.E.M.; Hendrickx, R.L.P.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 223, No. 2, 2012, p. 372-379.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fall back equilibria

AU - Kleppe, J.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2008-031

PY - 2012

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N2 - Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.

AB - Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014

M3 - Article

VL - 223

SP - 372

EP - 379

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

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