Abstract
In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 372-379 |
| Journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
| Volume | 223 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
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Fall back equilibria. / Kleppe, J.; Borm, P.E.M.; Hendrickx, R.L.P.
In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 223, No. 2, 2012, p. 372-379.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Fall back equilibria
AU - Kleppe, J.
AU - Borm, P.E.M.
AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.
N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2008-031
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.
AB - Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium, and discuss the relations with other Nash equilibrium refinements, in particular proper equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix games fall back equilibrium is a strict concept. We also consider the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix games.
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014
M3 - Article
VL - 223
SP - 372
EP - 379
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
SN - 0377-2217
IS - 2
ER -