Fall back equilibrium for 2xn bimatrix games

J. Kleppe; P.E.M. Borm; R.L.P. Hendrickx

doi:10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5

Fall back equilibrium for 2xn bimatrix games

J. Kleppe, P.E.M. Borm, R.L.P. Hendrickx

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	171-186
Journal	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume	78
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5
Publication status	Published - 2013

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title = "Fall back equilibrium for 2xn bimatrix games",

abstract = "In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.",

author = "J. Kleppe and P.E.M. Borm and R.L.P. Hendrickx",

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T1 - Fall back equilibrium for 2xn bimatrix games

AU - Kleppe, J.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.

AB - In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.

U2 - 10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5

DO - 10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5

M3 - Article

VL - 78

SP - 171

EP - 186

JO - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

SN - 1432-2994

IS - 2

ER -

Fall back equilibrium for 2xn bimatrix games

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