Fall back proper equilibrium

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Abstract

Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment in which the players play a passive role is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper, we introduce a more active role for the players, leading to the refinement of fall back proper equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)402-412
JournalTop
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017

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Non-cooperative Game
Justification
Refinement
Experiment

Keywords

  • proper equilibrium
  • fall back proper equilibrium

Cite this

Kleppe, John ; Borm, Peter ; Hendrickx, Ruud. / Fall back proper equilibrium. In: Top . 2017 ; Vol. 25, No. 2. pp. 402-412.
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Fall back proper equilibrium. / Kleppe, John; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud.

In: Top , Vol. 25, No. 2, 07.2017, p. 402-412.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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