Farsightedly stable networks

P.J.J. Herings*, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g c G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network Outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of C satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)526-541
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume67
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Networks
  • Farsighted players
  • Stability
  • Pairwise deviations
  • Efficiency
  • COALITIONAL STABILITY
  • ECONOMIC NETWORKS

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