Feedback and dynamics in public good experiments

M. Bigoni, S. Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and/or earnings on contributions and the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions are lower when feedback on earnings is provided compared to when feedback on contributions is provided. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions compared to individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)86-95
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume82
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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