Fight or flight: Endogenous timing in conflicts

Boris van Leeuwen, Theo Offerman, Jeroen van de Ven

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose between fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions, and document suboptimal predatory fighting.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages45
JournalThe Review of Economics and Statistics
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - Aug 2020

Keywords

  • fight-or-flight
  • contest
  • sorting
  • theory
  • experiment

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