From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen

J.T.R. Stoop, C.N. Noussair, D.P. van Soest

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. Group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish. Consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results laboratory experiments, we find no cooperation. A series of additional treatments identifies causes of the difference. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires reducing fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1027-1056
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume120
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Fishing
Field experiment
Fish
Classical economics
Economic theory
Laboratory experiments

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Stoop, J.T.R. ; Noussair, C.N. ; van Soest, D.P. / From the lab to the field : Cooperation among fishermen. In: Journal of Political Economy. 2012 ; Vol. 120, No. 6. pp. 1027-1056.
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Stoop, JTR, Noussair, CN & van Soest, DP 2012, 'From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen' Journal of Political Economy, vol. 120, no. 6, pp. 1027-1056.

From the lab to the field : Cooperation among fishermen. / Stoop, J.T.R.; Noussair, C.N.; van Soest, D.P.

In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 120, No. 6, 2012, p. 1027-1056.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Stoop, J.T.R.

AU - Noussair, C.N.

AU - van Soest, D.P.

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JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

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