From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence

S. Fischer, W. Güth, A. Stiehler, W. Müller

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

265 Downloads (Pure)
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages32
Volume2003-41
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-41

Keywords

  • commitment
  • imperfect observability
  • ultimatum bargaining games
  • Nash bargaining game
  • experiments

Cite this

Fischer, S., Güth, W., Stiehler, A., & Müller, W. (2003). From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-41). Microeconomics.