Game theoretic analysis of maximum cooperative purchasing situations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This article introduces maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP)-situations, a new class of cooperative purchasing situations. Next, an explicit alternative mathematical characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games is provided. The allocation of possible cost savings in MCP-situations, in which the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a group of players, is analyzed by defining corresponding cooperative MCP-games. We show that a decreasing unit price is a sufficient condition for a nonempty core: there is a set of marginal vectors that belong to the core. The nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in polynomial time from one of these marginal vectors. To show this result, we use the new mathematical characterization for the nucleolus for cooperative games. Using the decomposition of an MCP-game into unanimity games, we find an explicit expression for the Shapley value. Finally, the behavior of the solution concepts is compared numerically.
Original language English 607-624 Naval Research Logistics 60 8 https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21556 Published - Dec 2013

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Game
Nucleolus
Cooperative Game
Shapley Value
Unit
Solution Concepts
Polynomial time
Polynomials
Decomposition
Decompose
Sufficient Conditions
Alternatives
Costs

Keywords

• cooperative games
• nucleolus
• shapley value

Cite this

@article{f772f830000e465fb55417faf45abb97,
title = "Game theoretic analysis of maximum cooperative purchasing situations",
abstract = "This article introduces maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP)-situations, a new class of cooperative purchasing situations. Next, an explicit alternative mathematical characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games is provided. The allocation of possible cost savings in MCP-situations, in which the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a group of players, is analyzed by defining corresponding cooperative MCP-games. We show that a decreasing unit price is a sufficient condition for a nonempty core: there is a set of marginal vectors that belong to the core. The nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in polynomial time from one of these marginal vectors. To show this result, we use the new mathematical characterization for the nucleolus for cooperative games. Using the decomposition of an MCP-game into unanimity games, we find an explicit expression for the Shapley value. Finally, the behavior of the solution concepts is compared numerically.",
keywords = "cooperative games, purchasing, nucleolus, shapley value",
author = "{Groote Schaarsberg}, M. and P.E.M. Borm and H.J.M. Hamers and J.H. Reijnierse",
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month = "12",
doi = "10.1002/nav.21556",
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journal = "Naval Research Logistics",
issn = "0894-069X",
publisher = "John Wiley & Sons Inc.",
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}

In: Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 60, No. 8, 12.2013, p. 607-624.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Game theoretic analysis of maximum cooperative purchasing situations

AU - Groote Schaarsberg, M.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Hamers, H.J.M.

AU - Reijnierse, J.H.

PY - 2013/12

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AB - This article introduces maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP)-situations, a new class of cooperative purchasing situations. Next, an explicit alternative mathematical characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games is provided. The allocation of possible cost savings in MCP-situations, in which the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a group of players, is analyzed by defining corresponding cooperative MCP-games. We show that a decreasing unit price is a sufficient condition for a nonempty core: there is a set of marginal vectors that belong to the core. The nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in polynomial time from one of these marginal vectors. To show this result, we use the new mathematical characterization for the nucleolus for cooperative games. Using the decomposition of an MCP-game into unanimity games, we find an explicit expression for the Shapley value. Finally, the behavior of the solution concepts is compared numerically.

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KW - nucleolus

KW - shapley value

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