Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks

The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The identification of key players in a terrorist network can lead to prevention of attacks, due to efficient allocation of surveillance means or isolation of key players in order to destabilize the network. In this paper we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist networks. The advantage of this approach is that both the structure of the terrorist network, which usually reflects a communication structure, as well non-network features, which represent individual parameters like financial means or bomb building skills, can be taken into account. The application of our methodology results in rankings of the terrorists in the network. We illustrate our methodology by two case studies: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing and Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack, which has led to new insights in the operational networks responsible for these attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Volume2011-107
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-107

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Keywords

  • terrorism
  • network analysis
  • centrality
  • game theory

Cite this

Lindelauf, R., Hamers, H. J. M., & Husslage, B. G. M. (2011). Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks: The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-107). Tilburg: Operations research.
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Lindelauf, R, Hamers, HJM & Husslage, BGM 2011 'Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks: The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-107, Operations research, Tilburg.

Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks : The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. / Lindelauf, R.; Hamers, H.J.M.; Husslage, B.G.M.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-107).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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