Games With General Coalitional Structure

O. Selcuk, A.J.J. Talman

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Abstract

Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of players. This marginal contribution can be a joint contribution of several players and is equally divided among those players. Any set system representing a coalitional structure induces a collection of coalitional trees, whose nodes may consist of subsets of players. As solution we take the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to all coalitional trees. The solution is ecient and several other properties are studied and some special cases are considered.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages23
Volume2013-002
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2013-002

Keywords

  • TU game
  • cooperation structure
  • marginal contribution
  • set system
  • Shapley value

Cite this

Selcuk, O., & Talman, A. J. J. (2013). Games With General Coalitional Structure. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-002). Econometrics.