Abstract
We propose an axiom that we call Agreement to deal with changing preferences
and derive its empirical implications. The resulting revealed preference condition
generalises GARP when preferences are different but preferences in one context are
informative about preferences in another context. We apply this idea to a social
choice experiment, where a player can respond to another player being kind or
relatively unkind. We find that people have a consistent preferences for each case,
but that preferences depend on the kindness of the other player, and that subjects
act in line with Agreement. We thus provide support for modelling and interpreting
responses to the intentions of other players as a preference for reciprocity.
and derive its empirical implications. The resulting revealed preference condition
generalises GARP when preferences are different but preferences in one context are
informative about preferences in another context. We apply this idea to a social
choice experiment, where a player can respond to another player being kind or
relatively unkind. We find that people have a consistent preferences for each case,
but that preferences depend on the kindness of the other player, and that subjects
act in line with Agreement. We thus provide support for modelling and interpreting
responses to the intentions of other players as a preference for reciprocity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 37 |
| Volume | 2020-035 |
| Publication status | Published - 21 Dec 2020 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2020-035 |
Keywords
- social preferences
- reciprocity
- nonparametric methods