Giving According to Agreement

Jan Heufer, Paul van Bruggen, Jingni Yang

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We propose an axiom that we call Agreement to deal with changing preferences
and derive its empirical implications. The resulting revealed preference condition
generalises GARP when preferences are different but preferences in one context are
informative about preferences in another context. We apply this idea to a social
choice experiment, where a player can respond to another player being kind or
relatively unkind. We find that people have a consistent preferences for each case,
but that preferences depend on the kindness of the other player, and that subjects
act in line with Agreement. We thus provide support for modelling and interpreting
responses to the intentions of other players as a preference for reciprocity.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages37
Volume2020-035
Publication statusPublished - 21 Dec 2020

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2020-035

Keywords

  • social preferences
  • reciprocity
  • nonparametric methods

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